FUTURE INTERESTS
BERTEL M. SPARKS

A MONG the significant developments within the year has been the judicial acceptance of the wait-and-see doctrine in one jurisdiction, the
application of the rule in Shelley's case to personal property in another
and the express rejection of the worthier title doctrine in any form in a
third. Distribution of a condemnation award when land encumbered with
future interests is taken by eminent domain has been dealt with, and a charitable corporation has been permitted a rather wide discretion in altering
its operation without forfeiting land held subject to a reverter provision if
it ever ceases "to be used for the purposes set forth in the charter" of the
charitable corporation. The problems involved in determining the meaning of "heirs" and "next of kin" and ascertaining class membership have
been before the courts with their usual level of frequency.
Reversionary Interests.-It seems that private land use restrictions can
call for a judicial determination of whether a split-level home is a one or
a two-story residence.' A deed conveying land located on a hillside and
sloping away from the street restricted its use to "one-story residences and
garages" and provided that upon breach of this restriction "the title to said
premises shall immediately, ipso facto, revert to" the grantors.- It was held
that a building that was one story in front but two stories in the rear did
not constitute a breach of the condition.
A more dramatic case raising the question of what constitutes a breach
involved a conveyance to a charitable corporation known as the Georgia
Military Academy.3 The deed contained a provision that "if ever the aforementioned properties herein conveyed cease to be used for the purposes set
forth in the charter of the grantee corporation," they were to revert to the
heirs of the grantor.4 The terms of the academy's charter were not fully set
out in the opinion, but it was clear that its purpose included the operation
of a preparatory school for boys and young men, including military training. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the academy could (1) abolish military training, (2) admit females and (3) change the name of the
institution without forfeiting its title to the property held subject to the
above provision.'
Bertel M. Sparks is Professor of Law at New York University School of Law and
a Member of the Kentucky Bar.
1. Guttman v. Howard Homes, Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 616, 50 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966).

2. Id. at 617, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
3. Harris v. Georgia Military Academy, 221 Ga. 721, 146 S.E.2d 913 (1966).
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 724, 146 S.E.2d at 915-16.
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A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Tennessee' establishes
three propositions theretofore uncertain in that state; they are (1) a right
of entry is inalienable before breach of the condition subsequent, (2) an
attempt to alienate does not destroy the right, and (3) some act of re-entry
is necessary to revest title upon breach of condition. The decision against
alienability was made in spite of a statutory provision that "[Elvery grant
or devise or real estate, or any interest therein, shall pass all the estate or
interest of the grantor or devisor, . .."'the Tennessee court taking the
position that a right of entry is a mere possibility which does not qualify
as either an "estate" or "interest." s
Rule in Shelley's Case.-The rule in Shelley's case was applied in
Illinois where there was a life interest in a spendthrift trust with a remainder to the life tenant's heirs.' The equitable quality of the remainder,
essential to the application of the rule, was found in the trustee's duty to
pay the life tenant's funeral expenses, an act which had to be performed
after the life tenant's death, and then pay the corpus over to the heirs. The
life tenant's claim to a fee was not barred by his failure to assert it within
his lifetime nor by his participation in litigation which impliedly recognized his interest as being only a life estate.
The real surprise came in North Carolina where the rule in Shelley's
case was applied to personal property, the court declaring that "the rule
in Shelley's case has been consistently applied in North Carolina to the
disposition of personal property where the language would require application of the rule in a disposition of real estate."10 The authorities cited for
this statement were all old and consisted largely of cases where the property concerned was slaves. Prior to this decision it had been suggested that
the earlier cases applying the rule to personal property probably resulted
from the tendency to treat slaves more like realty than like other chattels
and that these decisions would probably not be followed at the present
time. 1 However, the application of the rule to personal property in the
present case is unequivocal. 2
6. Pickens v.Daugherty, 397 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1966).
7. Tenn. Code Ann. § 64-501 (1955).
8. 397 S.W.2d at 819. For the operation of similar statutes in other states see Simes
& Smith, Future Interests § 1862 (2d ed. 1956). As to whether or not a right of entry
is an interest in land see 2 Powell, Real Property fI 272 (1950) ; Simes & Smith, supra

at § 242.
9. Seymour v. Heubaum, 65 Ill.
App. 2d 89, 211 N.E.2d 897 (1965). The case in.
volved the will of a testatrix who died prior to the statutory abolition of the rule in
Illinois in 1953. Ill.
Ann. Stat. cb. 30, §§ 186-87 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
10. Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 206, 143 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1965).
11. Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 367 (2d ed. 1956).
12. See also Wright v. Vaden, 266 N.C. 299, 146 S.E.2d 31 (1966) (giving express

recognition to the application of the Shelley rule to personalty although the facts in the
particular case did not call for its operation).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

FUTURE INTERESTS
Wordder Title Doctrine.-Probably the year's most significant decision 3 in this area occurred in the District of Columbia where a settlor
transferred certain property to a trustee to pay income to the settlor for
life with remainder to such persons as the settler should by will appoint,
and in default of appointment, to the settloer's next of kin. No power to
alter, amend or revoke was reserved. The settlor later became displeased
with the arrangement and brought a proceeding to modify the trust to
permit payment to the settlor of a certain amount of principal each year.
She proceeded on the theory that the worthier title doctrine precluded the
creation of any interest in her next of kin and left a reversion after the
life estate in herself. The worthier title doctrine could have been recognized
as a rule of construction and the petition nevertheless denied on the theory
that the reservation of a testamentary power of appointment showed an
intent to create a remainder in the next of kin.1 4 But, in refusing to permit
a revocation, the federal appeals court did not rely upon this theory.
Instead it was declared "that the doctrine of worthier title is no part of the
law of trusts in the District of Columbia, either as a rule of law or as a
rule of construction."' 5
Legal Relations Among Owners of Successive Interests.-An eminent
domain case, worthy of note, involved the taking of a part of a tract held
by a life tenant with remainders over. The part taken divided the retained
land into two separate tracts and destroyed a private road, a water line, a
small pond, fences and a small house. The condemnation award was based
inpart upon the extent to which the taking had destroyed the use of the
land retained. The life tenant was permitted to use part of the award for
the reconstruction of the destroyed facilities, and the remaining part was
invested, the income payable to the life tenant and the corpus being held
for the remaindermen.1 0
In Georgia, the petition of a life tenant for the sale of unproductive
property and the investment of the proceeds for the benefit of all concerned was granted,' 7 and in Nebraska, a remainderman's suit for partition
was denied so long as there was objection from the life tenant."8
ConstructionProblems and Class Gifts.-Although it should be axio13. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Comment, 41

N.Y.U.L Rev. 1228 (1966).
14. In re Burchell's Estate, 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E.2d 293 (1949); Richardson v.
Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E.2d 54 (1948); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co,
250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929).
15. 361 F.2d at 564.
16. Bradley v. Bradley, 185 So. 2d 655 (Miss. 1966).
17. Webb v. Jones, 221 Ga. 754, 146 S.E.2d 910 (1966).
18. Fisher v.Peden, 179 Neb. 150, 137 N.W.2d 349 (1965).
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matic that the presence of one condition, whether precedent or subsequent,
is not a sufficient reason for implying another, efforts to accomplish that
result form a frequent source of litigation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found it necessary to overrule what appears to be inconsistent authority 9 in order to reach that result.20 But in New York, the appellate
division experienced little difficulty in holding that a remainder that was
contingent upon the life tenant's dying without surviving issue was not defeated by the remainderman's failure to survive the life tenant.' In like
manner a provision that if either of two named remaindermen dies without
children prior to the death of the life tenant his share will go to the survivor, gives the longest liver an absolutely vested interest if neither survives the life tenant and neither leaves any children. 2 - A California testator
provided for a separate trust for each of two life tenants. He then provided
for a remainder following the first trust with a divesting condition if the
remainderman failed to survive that life tenant. In a separate paragraph of
the will, a remainder following the second trust was given to the same
remainderman "under the same conditions" as the first remainder. The
remainderman survived the first life tenant but predeceased the second. The
court adhered to the literal words of the will and permitted the absolute
vesting of both remainders.2" In another decision, one that appears to rest
on very questionable reasoning, an Iowa court held that a gift over, if the
first taker died without issue, failed when the beneficiary of the gift over
24
failed to survive the first taker.
Even when there is an express condition of survivorship, there is
sometimes uncertainty as to what event the remaindermen must survive. A
postponed gift to "my living children" was held to mean children living
at the date of distribution. 20 But a postponed bequest without any express
requirement of survivorship vests in all members of the class who are living
at the death of the testator, and a provision for divestment if any die
leaving children prior to the date of distribution has no effect upon the
interest of any member of the class who dies without children prior to that
time.20 Likewise, a postponed gift to an individual legatee with a provision
for a substitutional gift if the legatee fails to survive the testator and dies
without issue will not be divested if the legatee survives the testator but
19. Lepps v. Lee, 92 Ky. 16, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 317, 17 S.W. 146 (1891).
20. Saulsberry v. Second Nat'l Bank, 400 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1966).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

In re Ashner's Will, 24 App. Div. 2d 595, 262 N.Y.S.2d 261 (2d Dep't 1965).
In re Washburn's Will, 24 App. Div. 2d 83, 264 N.Y.S.2d 33 (3d Dep't 1965).
In re Estate of Ash, 50 Cal. Rptr. 549, 413 P.2d 149 (1966).
Schau v. Cecil, 136 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1965).
Miller v. Rogers, 246 S.C. 438, 144 S.E.2d 485 (1965).
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank v. McCoy, 212 A.2d 53 (R.I. 1965).
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dies without issue prior to the date of distribution. 7 However, a remainder
that is unconditional except for a provision for a gift over if the remainderman "should have no direct blood heirs" creates in the remainderman a
fee simple subject to an executory interest.2 8
The year under review has encountered the usual amount of difficulty
in ascertaining the meaning of "heirs," "next of kin" and words of like
import. Such expressions should be avoided in dispositive instruments
unless extreme care is exercised in seeing that their meaning is clear.
Where there is a remainder to the heirs of a life tenant, the fact that the
only issue of the life tenant fails to survive her is not sufficient reason for
not ascertaining heirs in the usual statutory manner." But if the remainder
is to the heirs of the testator, and the life tenant is one such heir, there is
a difference of opinion as to whether heirs means "heirs" or whether it
means those who would be heirs if the testator survived the life tenant. 0
North Carolina adheres to the minority view that "next of kin" means
"nearest of kin," i.e., the nearest blood relatives without reference to the
Statute of Distributions.3 1 A recent case in that state presented an occasion for ascertaining "nearest of kin" as if the testator had survived the life
tenant.

32

Rule Against Perpetuities.-Even without the aid of a statute, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi appears to have accepted the wait-and-sce
doctrine without reservation.33 A testamentary gift over to private takers
upon the contingency of its being declined by two named charities was
27. In re Trust of McDowell, 31 Wis. 2d 519, 143 N.W.2d 506 (1956). It vwas argued
on behalf of the beneficiary of the substitutional gift that he was an implied taker if the
primary remainderman died without issue. Arguments in support of implied gifts usually
fail, but for an instance where such a gift was upheld, see Bredin v. Wilmington Trust
Co, 216 A.2d 685 (DeL Ch. 1965).
28. In re Estate of Carter, 404 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1966).
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Watkins, 396 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1965).
30. Clarken v. Brown, 137 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1965) (holding that heirs means
"heirs"); First Natl Bank v. Sullivan, 394 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1955) (holding that heirs
means those who would be heirs if the testator survived the life tenant).
31. McCain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 144 S.E.2d 857 (1965). See also Simes &
Smith, Future Interests § 727 (2d ed. 1956).
32. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 689 (1965).
33. Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So. 2d 158 (1966). For a further analysis of the 'wait-and-see doctrine see Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1230 (2d ed. 1956) ;
Bordwell, Perpetuities from the Point of View of the Draughtsman, 11 Rutgers L Rev.
429 (1956); Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky.
LJ. 3 (1960) ; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952) ; Meclem,
Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. Pa. L Rev. 965
(1959) ; Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 Mich. L Rev. 179 (1953) ;
Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule Against Perpetuitie., 34 B.U.L
Rev. 129 (1954).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

1966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
upheld when both charities declined less than twenty-one years after the
death of the testatrix. The court offered no guidance as to how long it
would have waited bad the charities delayed their election to decline.84 The
decision produces at least two unfortunate results. First, it creates an additional means for tying up property in a day when the trend appears to be
toward a more highly industrialized economy with its accompanying need
for greater mobility. 5 Second, it multiplies the occasions where litigation
will be necessary to determine ownership. These problems cannot be considered moot or hypothetical. Prior to the election by the charities to dedine the gift, there was uncertainty as to whether or not any future interest
of any kind had been created. In the meantime, the property was being
held by trustees. If the trustees had begun embezzling the funds, would the
would-be remaindermen have had any remedy for the protection of their
interests? This is only one of numerous unanswered questions inherent in
any rule of law requiring that the legality of a transaction be determined
by the happening of fortuitous events long after the transaction itself is an
accomplished fact.
The separable limitations doctrine was applied in Kansas to uphold a
gift over upon the death of two life tenants if both died without issue, although there were invalid alternative gifts over if either of them died leaving issue.3 0 In doing so, the court expressly rejected the wait-and-see doctrine and distinguished it from both the separable limitations principle and
the so-called "second look" which permits the court to consider the circumstances existing when a power of appointment is exercised even when the
period of the rule against perpetuities is being calculated from the time
the power was created. 7 Although the separable limitations principle is
not new or unique in the law, 88 it cannot be applied where the choice be34. A note writer has suggested that, "It might be inferred from the decision

.. .

that the court will wait until the termination of the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities." Note, 37 Miss. LJ. 487, 490 (1966). But one is left to speculate as to
the meaning of that statement. The rule against perpetuities has nothing to do with
the duration of interests. It is merely a rule which prevents the creation of certain types
of interests and it has no clear meaning aside from its operation in that direction.
35. The possible argument that the wait-and-see doctrine does nothing more than
permit property to be tied up during the period for which it could possibly have been
tied up anyway is effectively answered in Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1230 (2d
ed. 1956).
36. In re Freeman's Estate, 195 Kan. 190, 404 P.2d 222 (1965).
37. See Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir.), affirming 250 F. Supp. 551
(N.D. Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 824 (1966); In re Bird's Estate, 225 Cal. App.
2d 196, 37 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964); In re Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 Atl. 396
(1936).
38. Layton v. Black, 34 Del. Ch. 1, 99 A.2d 244 (1953); Proctor v. The Bishop of
Bath & Wells, 2 H. B1. 358, 126 Eng. Rep. 594 (1794). Cf. Hancock v. Watson, 27
App. Cas. 14 (1901) (doctrine not applied because the testator failed to separate the

contingencies and the court declined to do it for him).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

FUTURE INTERESTS
tween a valid and an invalid alternative depends solely upon the discretion
of a trustee.0 3 9
The problems of administrative contingencies, particularly those having to do with the settlement of estates, continue to create difficulties in a
number of states. In upholding a gift made contingent upon the probate of
a will, the Delaware Court of Chancery emphasized the criminal penalties
for failure to submit a will to probate and the pressures of inheritance and
estate taxes to get estates settled as reasons for concluding that it v'ould
be unreasonable to assume that probate might be delayed beyond the period
of the rule against perpetuities. 40 A similar result was reached in Connecticut as early as 1893, 4 1 and in recent years, a few other states have
moved in that direction, some by legislation42 and others by judicial decision.43 One of the states having a statute on the subject is Illinois, 4 but
a recent federal case applying the law of that state has expressed the
opinion that the same result would have been reached even if there had
been no statute 45 Thus it appears that in one form or another, the trend
is toward a rule which would uphold the validity of a limitation that is
dependent upon an administrative contingency that is likely to happen
within a relatively short time but which might possibly happen at a time
beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities. It appears that such a
rule is a wise one and should be applied as a rule of construction permitting
the implication of a further condition that the specified contingent event
happen within the period.
A bequest to "anyone of my relatives upon condition that said relative shall give my name to his or her child" is necessarily too remote if it
is not confined to a living relative."0 But a similar bequest to a charitable
39. Carr v. Jones, 403 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
40. Asehe v. Asche, 216 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch. 1966). Accord, Emerson v. Campbell,
32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1951) (postponement of vesting until final distribution of
an estate not too remote).
41. Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 AtL 585 (1893) (upholding a limitation postponing vesting until fourteen years after settlement of decedents estate).
42. E.g, 1l1. Ann. Stat. ch. 30, § 153a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law § 11-b (4) ; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42-c(4).
43. Elliott v. Travelers Ins. Co, 121 Ind. App. 400, 99 N.E.2d 274 (1951) (gift to
life tenant's executor or administrator held valid) ; Champlin v. Powers, 80 RI. 30, 90
A.2d 787 (1952) (postponement of vesting until the end of the administration of the
estate upheld).
44. f11. Ann. Stat. cl. 30, § 153a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
45. Breautl v. Feigenholtz, 250 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 358 F. 2d 39 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 US. 824 (1966) (also emphasizing that for this purpose
admission to probate means an effective or operative testamentary disposition and that
if the probate is later set aside the effect is the same as if the instrument had never been
admitted).
46. In re Finn's Will, 47 Misc. 2d 538, 262 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Surr. CL 1965).
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corporation yet to be formed should be upheld on the theory that the formation of the corporation is not a condition precedent to the gift's becoming
vested in the general public.47 And a devise that is otherwise vested in a
class within the period of the rule against perpetuities is not made invalid
by a provision in the will that the members of the class may divide the
property among themselves in any manner they choose. 48 The judicial
preference for early vesting49 sometimes results in the saving of a gift by
construing what might appear to be a condition as being a mere charge
upon an already vested interest."
A New Jersey court admitted evidence of physical impossibility of
issue for the purpose of deciding a trust termination question, 1 and it
appears that similar evidence would be admitted in that state in perpetuities
cases when it is relevant to the point in dispute.52 New York continues to be
burdened with the necessity of applying its peculiar "two lives" rule against
the suspension of the power of alienation when construing instruments that
took effect prior to the repeal of that rule.5
By its enactment of a statutory provision that for the purpose of applying the rule against perpetuities to interests created by a revocable
trust the period of the rule is to be calculated from the time the trust becomes irrevocable,54 Virginia has adopted what has usually been accomplished without the aid of a statute."' The Virginia legislature also exempted
certain aspects of the condominium from the operation of the rule,60 thus
providing a possible solution for a problem that is likely to become more
47. In re Harber's Estate, 99 Ariz. 323. 409 P.2d 31 (1965). Further treatment of
the same doctrine may be found in Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 344 (2d ed. 1964);
4 Scott, Trusts § 401.8 (2d ed. 1956).
48. Prior v. Prior, 395 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1965).
49. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 103 (4th ed. 1942); Simes & Smith,
Future Interests § 573 (2d ed. 1956).
50. Matthews v. Savage, 195 Kan. 501, 407 P.2d 559 (1965). Cf. Hardgrovo v.
Hardgrove, 240 Md. 634, 215 A.2d 183 (1965) (construing as a mere charge what might
appear to be a twenty-year restraint on alienation).
51. In re Estate of Ransom, 89 NJ. Super. 224, 214 A.2d 521 (App. Div. 1965).
52. See In re Lattouf's Will, 87 N.J. Super. 137, 208 A.2d 411 (App. Div. 1965);
1965 Ann. Survey Am. L. 498.
53. In re Estate of Holmes, 26 App. Div. 2d 151, 271 N.Y.S.2d 760 (4th Dep't 1966)
(construing the will of a testator who died in 1953). The "two lives" rule was repealed
in 1958 and the new law has been the subject of a number of statutory refinements added
since that time. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 11-11c; N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 42-42o.
54. Va. Code Ann. § 55-13.2 (Supp. 1966).
55. Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 155 A.2d 702 (1959).
56. Va. Code Ann. § 55-79.36 (Supp. 1966).
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acute with the increasing popularity of that particular device for owning
and developing real estate.7
The infectious invalidity problem and the employment of a cy pres
principle to remedy certain violations of the rule against perpetuities
have been the subjects of recent legislation in Missouri. 8 Professor Willard
L. Eckhardt has provided an excellent discussion of the peculiar problems
arising out of the effective date of the legislation,"" and it is hoped that his
promised studies in the substantive provisions of the act ill not be long
delayed.
Significant periodical contributions, not mentioned elsewhere, have
dealt with special perpetuities problems relating to charities 0 and to land
use controls."' There has also appeared a worthwhile analysis of certain
problems peculiar to a single jurisdiction 2 and a brief discussion of the
"measuring lives" problem with its application to recent legislative modifications of the rule."3
Powers of Appointment.-A will purporting to dispose of the testator's
entire estate is not within itself sufficient to exercise a general testamentary
power in Alabama," but the case reaching that result leaves a number of
unanswered questions. Two such powers were involved, one in the life beneficiary and one a reserved power in the settlor of an inter vivos trust. It was
clear that neither power was exercised but no reason was given as to why
that did not leave the appointive property in the estate of the settlor as an
undisposed of asset which would pass to his residuary legatees. The court
apparently assuming that the residuary legatees had to take as appointees
or not at all, directed a distribution to the settlor's next of kin and held
that "next of kin" should be construed to mean those persons who would have
been next of kin if the settlor bad died immediately after the death of the
57. aioller, The Condominium Confronts the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 N.Y.L.F.
377 (1964).
58. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 442,555 (Supp. 1966).

59. Eckhardt, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 31 Mlo. L Rev. 56 (1966). The
uniqueness of the Missouri application of the infectious invalidity doctrine prior to the
statutory enactment is considered in Eckhardt, Rule Against Perpetuities in Missouri,
30 Mfo. L. Rev. 27 (1965).
60. Lynn, Perpetuities-The Duration of Charitable Trusts and Foundations, 13
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1074 (1966); Najarian, Charitable Giving and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 70 Dick. L Rev. 455 (1966).
61. Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control-Pre-emptions, Perpetuities and Similar
Restraints, 20 Mliami L. Rev. 148 (1965).
62. Comment, The Rule Against Perpetuities in Alabama, 18 Ala. L. Rev. 129
(1965).
63. Lynn, Reforming the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1965 Duke LJ. 720.
64. Mastin v. Merchants Natl Bank, 278 Ala. 261, 177 So. 2d 817 (1965).
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life tenant. North Carolina has a statute providing that a general testamentary disposition of one's entire estate "shall be construed to include"
property over which the testator had a general power of appointment."
But it has been held that this statute does not apply to a special power even
though the residuary legatee is a proper object of the power."0 And even
though a residuary clause expressly provides for a disposition of all the
property owned by the testator-donee "or over which [he has] the power
of disposition," there is not necessarily a sufficient blending to make the
appointive assets part of the donee's estate for all purposes."' Such a provision, however, has been held sufficient in Illinois to subject the appointive
property to the payment of debts and costs of administration even though
the appointment itself might be defective and have to be set aside. 8
A power incapable of being presently exercised might be presently
released. In a case where there was created a contingent general testamentary power of appointment in the survivor of four children one of
whom had subsequently died, the remaining three joined in an agreement
which in form appeared to be an ineffective, premature attempt to exercise
the power. Since the agreement was for the benefit of the takers in default,
it was quite properly upheld as a valid release 9 thereby accomplishing the
desired result.
It has become quite common in recent years for the creators of powers
to impose special requirements concerning the manner in which the powers
may be exercised and much has also been said about the wisdom of and
the technique for exercising unknown powers. These topics constitute the
subject matter of an excellent study by Professor Edward H. Rabin.70 Another periodical writer has examined the recent statutory changes in the
New York law of powers. 7 And Professor Charles L. B. Lowndes made
a rather detailed study of the tax effects of restrictions upon the exercise
of appointment and related powers.72
65. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-43 (1966).
66. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267 N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41 (1966). Cf.
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. First Natl Bank, 344 Mass. 1, 181 N.E.2d 6 (1962).
67. In re Breault's Estate, 29 I1. 2d 165, 193 N.E.2d 824 (1963).
68. In re Breault's Estate, 63 Ill. App. 2d 246, 211 N.E2d 424 (1965) (purporting
to follow Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938). Cf. Fidu.
ciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947) ; Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass.
144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934) ; Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 141, 200 N.E. 674 (1936).
69. Wood v. American Security &Trust Co., 253 F. Supp. 592 (D.D.C. 1966).
70. Rabin, Blind Exercises of Powers of Appointment, 51 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1965).
71. Comment, Powers of Appointment-The New York Revision, 65 Colum. L. Roy.
1289 (1965).
72. Lowndes, Tax Consequences of Limitations Upon the Exercise of Powers, 1966
Duke L.J. 959.
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Power To Consume.-Ascertaining the extent of the power continues
to be the chief difficulty in this area and it does not appear that any more
exact standard than the requirement of good faith has been developed. 3
Even when the power is expressed in extremely broad terms, it is usually
held not to include the power to make gifts or otherwise divert the assets
to the benefit of third persons.74 But a life tenant having such a power may
validly transfer the property to a third person in consideration of a promise to provide care and maintenance for the life tenant." And a devise or
bequest to a wife "for her own use and behoof forever" followed by a gift
over of what remains undisposed of at the death of the wife gives the wife
a power to make gifts within her lifetime even though the remainder over
is good."0 It appears that the effect is to treat the power as a general power
of appointment." A gift of income unrestricted as to time coupled with an
unlimited power of disposition without any provision for a gift over is
sufficient to create a fee simple absolute.78 But a beneficial interest in a
trust identified as a life estate and followed by an express provision for a
gift over was construed to be a life estate in spite of a power in the life
tenant to withdraw "such sums from principal as she may . . .request
[with] no limitation... as to either the amount of or reason for such invasion of principal." 7'9 The case became the occasion for an excellent
review as it has developed in Colorado. 0
An intriguing problem in construction arose in North Carolina where
a life tenant was given a power to consume principal in an amount not to
exceed $1,800 per year. There was a remainder over of one-third to the
heirs of the life tenant and two-thirds to others. An unanticipated application of the rule in Shelley's case resulted in the life tenant getting one73. See generally Norvell, The Power to Consume, 28 Mich. S.BJ. 5 (March 1949).
74. Baldwin v. Hambleton, 196 Kan. 353, 411 P.2d 626 (1966) (holding that a
surviving 'wife clothed with a power to "have, use, mortgage, sell, convey and dispose"
was still subject to "a duty to act honorably and in good conscience" and vdthout power
to make gifts); In re Estate of Gramm, 420 Pa. 510, 218 A.2d 342 (1966) (power to
consume "the entire principal estate if, in her judgment, her needs require" it not 6ufficient to authorize even an indirect diversion of funds to third persons).
75. Mitchell v. Wilcox, 179 Neb. 553, 139 N.W.2d 293 (1966).
76. Jones v. Merrimack Valley School Dist., 107 N.H.144, 218 A.2d 55 (1966).
77. Although no tax questions were raised in the case concerned, it v;ould appear
that, contra to the usual rule regarding a life estate with power to consume, the gift
to the wife would qualify for the marital deduction in the husband's estate and that
the part that remained at the death of the wife would be included in her estate and
taxed again. Sparks, Application of the Marital Deduction to Joint and Mutual Wills,
37 Miss. W. 226 (1966).
78. In re Estate of Ransom, 89 NJ. Super. 224, 214 A.2d 521 (App. Div. 1965).
79. First Nat'l Bank v. People, 405 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1965).
80. Marsh, When Is a Life Estate Not a Life Estate in Colorado?, 43 Denver LJ.
173 (1966).
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third in fee simple absolute but her power to consume the remaining principal remained at $1,800 per year."' What would have happened if the
unanticipated application of the Shelley rule had given her two-thirds or
even nine-tenths in fee simple?
81. Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65 (1965).
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